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Abstract 
 
Interoceptive and exteroceptive information are both essential for the construction and update 
of self-awareness. Whereas several studies have shown how interoceptive accuracy or cardiac 
feedback influences body-awareness, no studies have looked at the reverse effect, namely 
how exteroceptively-driven changes in body-ownership and self-identification can influence 
individuals’ ability to detect internal bodily signals. We exposed participants to the Rubber 
Hand Illusion (Experiment 1) and to the Enfacement Illusion (Experiment 2), and tested how 
this change in the sense of body-ownership and self-identification affected their interoceptive 
accuracy (IAcc). The heartbeat-counting task was used to measure IAcc before the bodily 
illusions, and then the same task was interleaved with periods of visuo-tactile stimulation, 
during which synchronous and asynchronous multisensory stimulation was applied. We 
found that a change in body-ownership significantly improved performance of participants 
with lower interoceptive accuracy. In contrast, a change in self-identification significantly 
decreased performance of participants with higher interoceptive accuracy. These results 
suggest that changes in different domains of self-awareness can differentially impact 
individuals’ ability to accurately detect signals arising from within the body, highlighting the 
distinct role that interoceptive signals play for different facets of bodily self-consciousness.  
 
 
Keywords: self-awareness, body-ownership, self-identification, interoceptive accuracy, 
rubber hand illusion, Enfacement Illusion.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Bodily self-consciousness (BSC) results from the integration of two fundamental 
sources of body-related information, namely signals arising from the body as perceived from 
the outside and external environment (i.e. exteroception) and from within the body (i.e. 
interoception). The perception of the body from the outside has been shown to be essential in 
order to maintain and update BSC. For example, the integration of multisensory signals has 
been shown to play a fundamental role in body-ownership (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris, 
2010; Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager et at; 2007) and self-identification (Tsakiris, 2008). Bodily 
illusions such as the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) can modulate the awareness of one’s own 
body through the manipulation of visual and tactile synchrony (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998). 
In these experiments, seeing a rubber hand being stroked together with one’s own hidden hand 
provokes a change in body-ownership, whereby the rubber hand is perceived as belonging to 
one’s own body (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005). The influence of 
multisensory integration in updating our sense of body awareness has been shown in several 
other contexts, such as full body illusions (e.g. Ehrsson, 2007, Lenggenhager, et al., 2007) and 
self-identification (i.e. see the Enfacement Illusion (EI), Tsakiris, 2008). In the Enfacement 
Illusion, synchronous interpersonal multisensory stimulation (IMS) between the participant’s 
face and another person’s face evokes a measurable change in self-recognition, whereby a 
certain percentage of the other person’s face is identified as “self” (Tajadura-Jimenez et al., 
2012a), indicative of altered self-other boundaries (Paladino et al., 2010; Cardini et al., 2013; 
Tajadura-Jimenez & Tsakiris, 2014). Together, these findings seem to suggest that similar 
exteroceptive sensory processes are involved at different levels of body-awareness, from the 
ability to define ownership towards a body-part, to the ability to identify with one’s own face. 
Exteroceptive signals however are not the only relevant sources of information about 
the self. Together with exteroception, internal signals arising from within the body are essential 
in order to maintain a sense of self (Tsakiris, Tajadura-Jimenez, & Costantini, 2011). 
Interoceptive awareness - that is often operationalized as Interoceptive Accuracy (IAcc) - is 
the ability to perceive internal bodily signals such as cardiac activity, hunger, and distension 
of bladder and other visceral organs (Craig, 2002; 2010). IAcc has been considered a rather 
stable trait, whereby some individuals seem to be better than others in detecting and becoming 
aware of internal bodily signals (Herbert & Pollatos, 2012). Nevertheless, a renewed interest 
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in the topic of interoception has provided preliminary evidence of the interactive relationship 
between interoceptive and exteroceptive bodily signals.  
Direct behavioural evidence of the effects of interoception on body-ownership comes 
from three recent studies. The first study that tested the potential link between exteroceptive 
and interoceptive awareness of the body measured and quantified IAcc and compared this 
measure with the change in body-ownership caused by multisensory stimulation, using the RHI 
as a paradigmatic case of the exteroceptive self. Tsakiris et al (2011) observed a negative 
correlation between IAcc and RHI, such that people with lower IAcc showed a stronger RHI 
measured behaviourally and homeostatically (i.e. drop in skin temperature), suggesting that, in 
the absence of accurate interoceptive representations, one’s model of self is predominantly 
exteroceptive. Following this finding, two studies used cardio-visual feedback synchronous 
with one’s own heartbeat to induce changes in body-ownership (Aspell et al., 2013; Suzuki et 
al., 2013). Aspell and colleagues (2013) used cardio-visual illumination of a virtual body either 
in synchrony or asynchrony with respect to the participant’s heartbeat to show changes in body-
ownership, providing evidence of the integration between internal and external signals of the 
body. On a similar line of research, Suzuki et al. (2013) demonstrated the influence of 
interoceptive signals at the exteroceptive level by applying cardio-visual feedback to 
implement the RHI. In their study, participants were exposed to a virtual RHI set-up and 
experienced an increased illusion during synchronous cardio-visual feedback, compared to 
asynchronous feedback (Suzuki et al., 2013). More recently, studies have focused on the effect 
of pleasant affective touch, which is known to engage interoceptive processing, on body-
ownership (Crucianelli et al., 2013; Lloyd et al., 2013; van Stralen et al., 2014), suggesting 
again the influence of interoceptive cues on external signals related to the body. Taken together, 
these findings suggest that the relation between the perception of the body from the outside 
(i.e. exteroception) and the perception of the body from the inside (i.e. interoception) is 
fundamental to the coherence of the bodily self: their integration enables the self to feel 
grounded in a coherent body that consists of both exteroceptive and interoceptive 
representations. However, while these studies focused on the role of interoceptive signaling or 
levels of IAcc in modulating the experience of the body as perceived from the outside, the 
question of whether exteroceptively-driven changes in body-awareness can in turn influence 
interoceptive awareness remains unanswered.  
A recent unifying account of the self proposes that self-related information results from 
the integration between incoming sensory events with the existent mental representation of the 
self (Apps and Tsakiris, 2014; Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013). According to this 
Heartfelt Embodiment 
 
predictive coding model of the self (Seth, Suzuki, and Critchley 2011), incoming sensory inputs 
are interpreted in light of prediction signals derived from existing priors about the self (Apps 
and Tsakiris, 2014). The system’s ultimate goal is to reduce ‘free energy’, by minimising 
prediction errors through a process of matching between incoming information and its 
predictions (Apps and Tsakiris, 2014; Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013; see also for Samad, 
Chung & Shams, 2015 for direct evidence). In the context of maintaining an integrated sense 
of self, any update of self-representations is dependent upon prior beliefs derived from past 
events, with the aim of minimising prediction errors in favour of the most likely ‘self’ (Apps 
and Tsakiris, 2014). Thus, body-related multisensory signals (such as those implemented 
during the RHI and EI) may explain away prediction errors by creating a new model of the 
self, that incorporates the fake rubber hand or the other face into the self-mental representation 
(Suzuki et al., 2013). This change in BSC will result in an update of posterior probabilities and 
a decrease in the probability that one’s actual body or face is represented as ‘self’ (Apps and 
Tsakiris, 2014). As a result, one could expect an increase in top-down attention to the self, 
which in turn will produce an enhanced general precision of all self-relevant data, including 
interoceptive inputs. Previous studies have addressed the role of interoceptive signals in the 
multisensory predictive model of the self (Suzuki et al., 2013; Aspell et al., 2013). This 
investigation aimed to test the opposite effect, namely the influence of exteroceptive signalling 
in modulating the experience of the body from within.  
 In line with recent accounts, we assume that the self is a multilevel, multimodal 
construct, continually updated in the brain from all available interacting cues including 
interoception (Apps and Tsakiris, 2013; Seth, 2013). Precision necessarily varies along this 
hierarchy (Edwards et al., 2012). Self-focus can therefore enhance the precision of all self-
relevant and self-specifying signals, including interoceptive prediction errors, thus enabling 
updating of priors in interoceptive systems and consequent perception of heartbeats. If self-
focus enhances the precision of a high-level (conscious) prior for the multimodal self, this will 
affect the precision of priors and prediction errors at lower levels of the self-hierarchy 
(including those for the heartbeat itself). How such self-focus affects interoception under 
conditions that induce a change in self-representations induced by bodily illusions remains 
unknown. In the present study, we tackle two issues. First, we explore whether changes in 
body-awareness after exposure to the RHI and EI can affect individuals’ accuracy in detecting 
their internal bodily signals, quantified by the heartbeat-counting task (Schandry, 1981). To 
answer this question, we conducted two experiments using two different bodily illusions in two 
independent samples of participants. In Experiment 1, we manipulated the experience of body-
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ownership through the use of the RHI to measure changes in IAcc, whereas in Experiment 2 
we used the Enfacement Illusion to test whether changes in self-identification will lead to 
changes IAcc. Second, we were interested to test whether the hypothesized modulations of 
IAcc would be comparable across the two illusions. Even though recent findings on the 
relationship between changes in body-ownership and IAcc and changes in self-identification 
and IAcc (Tsakiris et al., 2011; Tajadura-Jimenez et al., 2012a; 2012b) have shown consistent 
results, namely that lower levels of IAcc were correlated with stronger illusions, the question 
of how changes in body- versus self-face representations elicited by the RHI and EI 
respectively can affect processing in the interoceptive domain remains unanswered. This 
question is important because of the distinctive role that one’s face plays not only for body-
awareness but also for the representation of one’s identity in relation to others. Nothing 
provides such a strong sense of self as looking at one’s own face, and the enfacement illusion, 
as an experimental model of self-identification has been shown to alter self-other boundaries 
(Paladino et al., 2010; Cardini et al., 2013; Tajadura-Jimenez & Tsakiris, 2014). We therefore 
hypothesised that the experience of the RHI and EI would modulate performance in the 
heartbeat task differently. In particular, we hypothesised that individuals with lower-IAcc at 
baseline would show a significant increase in their IAcc after exposure to the RHI, where body-
ownership is manipulated, consistent with past findings on the effects of self-processing on 
IAcc (Ainley et al, 2012). Specifically, we hypothesised that in these individuals exposure to 
the bodily illusion would increase attention to the body, which in turn will result in increased 
precision of all body-specifying information. However, in the case of the Enfacement Illusion 
where the affected body-part is closely linked to self-identity, for which interoceptive 
predictions may play an important role (Sedeño et al. 2014), we hypothesized a reduction in 
performance, especially for individuals with higher-IAcc. In particular individuals with higher 
IAcc would be more affected by exteroceptive stimulation on the face, because a change in 
self-identification may conflict with the interoceptive prediction of how identifying one’s face 
feels like, resulting in disrupted IAcc in individuals who have more precise interoceptive 
predictions.  To account for potential confounds of the heartbeat counting task (e.g. Ring et al., 
2015), we have included in our analysis variables that reflect the participants’ beliefs about 
heart rate, their time perception ability, and we did not provide any feedback on the 
participants’ performance during the experiment.  
 
2. Experiment 1 
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2.1 Materials and Methods 
2.1.1 Participants 
 
Participants were 42 students at Royal Holloway University of London. Twelve were 
excluded for artefacts in the heart rate data, which made it impossible to compute the number 
of recorded beats (7), for no experience of the RHI – mean score RHI questionnaire data < 0  
(4) (see Ehrsson et al., 2004; Ehrsson, Holmes, & Passingham, 2005; Apps et al., 2015 for a 
similar screening criterion), and for a baseline IAcc score < .20, which questioned the 
participant’s following of the instructions (1). Of the remaining 30 participants (2 male), the 
mean age was = 22.37yr (SD = 4.64). The study was approved by the Department of 
Psychology Ethics Committee, Royal Holloway, University of London.  
 
2.1.2 Experimental setup 
 
Heart rate was monitored with a piezo-electric pulse transducer attached to the 
participant’s right index finger (PowerLab 26T, AD Instruments, UK). To assess interoceptive 
accuracy, we used the Mental Tracking Method (MTM) (Schandry, 1981). Participants were 
asked to silently count their own heartbeats on an audio start cue until they received a stop cue. 
They were provided with standard instructions to count their heartbeats simply by ‘listening’ 
to their body without taking their pulse. No feedback was given at the end of each trial. Whilst 
they counted, they were asked to focus on a rubber hand positioned in front of them and to 
avoid performing any movement with their hands. The four trials (25 s, 35 s, 45 s, and 100 s) 
were presented in random order and constituted a block. To control for guessing of the number 
of heartbeat (Ainley et al., 2013), at the end of the experiment participants were asked to 
estimate the length of four, randomly presented, intervals – Time Modulus (19 s, 37 s, 49 s, 
and 96 s) and to provide an estimate of their resting heart rate (question: “How many heartbeats 
do you think you have a rest, in a minute?”) – EstimatedHBM (Dunn et al., 2010).  
For the Rubber Hand Illusion task, a realistic rubber hand was situated 15 cm to the 
right of the participant’s own hand. The participant’s hand and the rubber hand were positioned 
in a box frame, which hid the participant’s own hand from view but allowed the rubber hand 
to be viewed. The experimenter sat in front of the participant and manually delivered 
stimulation to the visible rubber hand and the participant’s unseen hand using two identical 
paintbrushes. Both the participant’s own hand and the rubber hand were stimulated in the same 
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manner, with each stroke lasting approximately 500 to 1500 ms. Participants were stimulated 
on their second finger from the proximal interphalangeal joint to the tip of the finger, either in 
synchrony (RHI) or asynchrony (RHA) with the rubber hand. In the synchronous condition, 
the participant’s hand and the rubber hand were stroked simultaneously in the same anatomical 
location. In the asynchronous condition, the stimulation of the participant’s hand and the rubber 
hand were offset. In both conditions, participants were instructed to keep their own hand still 
and carefully observe the rubber hand. To provide a measure of ownership over the rubber 
hand, participants were asked to complete a 7-item questionnaire, which investigated their 
subjective experiences of illusory ownership during multisensory stimulation (Table 1). 
Questions were derived from Longo, Schuur, Kammers, Tsakiris, and Haggard (2008). 
Participants were asked to indicate the extent of their agreement or disagreement with the 
statements, using a 7-point Likert scale (from -3, “strongly disagree”, to +3, “strongly agree”). 
As the focus of the study was on changes in body-ownership rather than self-location, and 
given that recent studies have questioned the validity of proprioceptive drift as a measure of 
body-ownership in the RHI (e.g. Rohde, Di Luca, & Ernst, 2011; Holle et al., 2011), we decided 
to focus on established introspective measures of the experience of body-ownership (Longo et 
al., 2008).  
 
Figure 1 Illustration of the experimental paradigm, showing the procedure during baseline, visuo-tactile 
synchronous (RHI) and visuo-tactile asynchronous (RHA) conditions. In each condition, participants 
were instructed to watch a rubber hand positioned in front of them whilst keeping their left hand inside 
a box frame. Within each block of experimental condition, there were 4 MTM trials during which 
participants were asked to focus and count the number of heartbeats while they were looking at the 
rubber hand. Before each MTM trial participants received 60 s of visuo-tactile stimulation – 
synchronous to the rubber hand in the RHI condition and asynchronous in the RHA condition. The 
order of presentation of RHI and RHA conditions were counterbalanced across participants, while the 
order of presentation of the MTM trials within each block was randomized.  
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2.1.3 Experimental procedure 
 
After giving informed consent, participants’ sex and age were recorded. Participants 
were instructed to sit in front of a table and position their left hand inside the box frame so that 
the tip of their left index finger would touch a small Velcro tape attached to the box. They were 
prompted to keep this position at the start of each block, avoiding any movement with their 
hand and fingers. After one brief training trial (15 s) during which participants familiarised 
with the MTM, there were 12 trials in total, consisting of 4 MTM trials per condition – baseline, 
RHI, and RHA. In the RHI and RHA conditions, before each MTM trial participants received 
60 s of visuo-tactile stimulation – synchronous to the rubber hand in the RHI condition and 
asynchronous to the rubber hand in the RHA condition. Each MTM trial was performed after 
the 60 s of visuo-tactile stimulation was completed. After each MTM trial, participants were 
instructed to verbally indicate the number of heartbeats they had counted (see Figure 1).  
At the end of both the RHI and RHA conditions, participants were given to complete 
the 7-item questionnaire on their experiences of illusory ownership during multisensory 
stimulation (Table 1). Participants were required to evaluate their agreement in relation to each 
statement, using a 7-point Likert scale (from -3, “strongly disagree”, to +3, “strongly agree”).   
 
2.1.4 Data analysis 
 
Heartbeat traces were analysed using LabChart8. We identified and counted the number 
of R-wave peaks on the heart trace recorded for each participant in each trial, as well as the 
average heart rates for each trial (Jennings et al., 1981). Artefacts were visually inspected and, 
if necessary, R-wave peaks were re-counted manually. Participants were excluded where 
artefacts created uncertainty about the number of recorded beats. Interoceptive accuracy was 
calculated as (1/4Σ (1−(|recorded heartbeats−counted heartbeats|/recorded 
heartbeats))(Schandry, 1981; Ainley et al., 2014). Higher scores indicate higher 
interoceptive accuracy. As in Dunn et al. (2010) and Ainley et al. (2014) we used the Time 
Modulus and EstimatedHBM as additional measure to control on participants’ guessing of 
heartbeats. The Time Modulus was calculated as (1/4 Σ (1−(|estimated elapsed 
time−actual elapsed time|/actual elapsed time)).  
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As in previous studies that investigated IAcc (Ainley et al., 2012; 2014; Maister and 
Tsakiris, 2014), a median split of IAcc scores was performed in the baseline condition (median 
= 0.66) to divide the sample into higher-IAcc (above median) and lower-IAcc (below median) 
participants. In both groups, participants were 14 female and 1 male. We then subtracted the 
Baseline IAcc score from the RHI IAcc score and RHA IAcc score to generate two IAcc-
change scores, one for each of the two experimental conditions. These scores reflected how 
IAcc changed from baseline after being exposed to the synchronous (RHI) or asynchronous 
(RHA) stroking, with positive scores indicating an improvement from baseline (Maister and 
Tsakiris, 2014). Data were analysed using an ANCOVA with Experimental Condition as a 
within-subjects variable and Order of Presentation (to control for carryover effect) and IAcc 
level as between-subject variables. The Time Modulus, the EstimatedHBM, and the Ownership 
scores (average scores in RHI and RHA) were used as covariates, to account for potential 
confounds of the heartbeat counting task (Ring et al., 2015), and for the possible modulation 
of the experienced body illusions in IAcc. Greenhouse–Geisser correction was applied when 
sphericity could not be assumed (Mauchly’s test for sphericity, p = .05). Comparisons were 
assessed for significance using planned two-tailed t-tests. 
Questionnaire responses (Shapiro-Wilk test of normality: RHI, p = 0.26, RHA, p = 
0.31) on the subjective experience of ownership were analysed by averaging together ratings 
across all 7 statements, which provided an estimate of ownership experienced for each 
participant in each condition. 
 
 
 
3. Results  
 
We first examined whether the RHI was successfully elicited using a mixed ANOVA. 
Ownership scores were entered into a 2 (Conditions: RHI vs RHA) x 2 (IAcc level: lower-IAcc 
vs higher-IAcc) ANOVA. We found that the RHI was successfully elicited in the synchronous 
but not the asynchronous condition, F(1,28)= 58.15 p <.05, and the strength of the illusion did 
not depend on baseline levels of IAcc, F(1,28)= 2.08, p >.05.  
We used the two IAcc-change scores, one for each of the two experimental conditions, 
to investigate if and how IAcc was modulated by the experience of owning the rubber hand 
after being exposed to the RHI, using a mixed ANCOVA. We found no significant main effect 
of condition on IAcc, F(1,22) = 0.82, p = 0.38, after controlling for Time Modulus, 
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EstimatedHBM, and Ownership Scores (average scores in RHI and RHA). However, the 
interaction Condition X IAcc level was significant, F(1,22) = 4.90, p = 0.037, ƞ2 = 0.18 (Figure 
2), indicating that the feeling of owning a rubber hand elicited by synchronous stroking 
significantly improved interoceptive accuracy for the lower-IAcc group, t(14) = 2.57, p = 0.02, 
d = 0.46, but not for the higher-IAcc group, t(14) = -1.02, p = 0.33. As expected, we observed 
a significant main effect of IAcc level, F(1,22) = 5.03, p = 0.035, ƞ2 = 0.19. All other 
interactions and main effects were not significant; interactions: Condition X Time Modulus, 
F(1,22) = 0.88, p > 0.05; Condition X EstimatedHBM, F(1,22) = 0.11, p > 0.05; Condition X 
Ownership Score RHI, F(1,22) = 0.007, p > 0.05; Condition X Ownership Score RHA, F(1,22) 
= 0.12, p > 0.05; Condition X Order of Condition, F(1,22) = 2.17, p > 0.05; main effects: Time 
Modulus, F (1,22) = 0.21, p > 0.05; EstimatedHBM, F(1,22) = 0.37, p > 0.05, Ownership Score 
RHI, F(1,22) = 0.92, p > 0.05; Ownership Score RHA, F(1,22) = 0.42, p > 0.05, Order of 
Condition, F(1,22) = 0.14, p > 0.05.  
 
 
Figure 2 Mean IAcc-change scores of the lower-IAcc and higher-IAcc groups in the rubber hand 
illusion (RHI) and rubber hand asynchronous (RHA) conditions. Error bars show standard error (SE). 
 
 
Questionnaire items: RHI RHA 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
ITEM 1: During the block it 
seemed like I was looking 
directly at my own hand, 
rather than at a rubber hand. 
1.47 1.28 -0.5 1.78 
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ITEM 2: During the block it 
seemed like the rubber hand 
began to resemble my real 
hand. 
1.93 0.74 0.1 1.67 
ITEM 3: During the block it 
seemed like the rubber hand 
belonged to me 
1.87 1.04 -0.43 1.92 
ITEM 4: During the block it 
seemed like the rubber hand 
was my hand. 
1.8 1.03 -0.57 1.87 
ITEM 5: During the block it 
seemed like the rubber hand 
was part of my body. 
1.8 0.96 -0.4 1.99 
ITEM 6: During the block it 
seemed like my hand was in 
the location where the rubber 
hand was. 
1.83 1.29 -0.53 2.08 
ITEM 7: During the block it 
seemed like the rubber hand 
was in the location where my 
hand was. 
0.83 1.76 -0.77 1.99 
Table 1 Questionnaire items presented after the body illusion, in both the synchronous and 
asynchronous stimulations, with mean and standard deviation of scores for each question. Participants 
were required to evaluate their agreement in relation to each statement, using a 7-point Likert scale 
(from -3, “strongly disagree”, to +3, “strongly agree”).   
 
4. Discussion of Experiment 1 
With Experiment 1 we investigated whether changes in body-ownership change 
interoceptive accuracy. We demonstrate that, after being exposed to a bodily illusion that 
changes body-ownership, individuals with initially lower levels of interoceptive accuracy 
improve their ability to accurately detect internal bodily signals. However, the experienced 
change in body-ownership did not benefit individuals with higher levels of accuracy. While 
these results provide evidence of exteroceptively-driven changes in interoceptive accuracy, the 
extent to which specific domains of self-awareness can differentially interact with our ability 
to focus on internal bodily signals remains unknown.  With Experiment 2, we investigated 
whether the manipulation of self-identification can affect interoceptive accuracy, measured 
through heartbeat detection task (Schandry, 1991). To quantify the role of changes in self-
identification in interoceptive accuracy, we exposed participants to the Enfacement Illusion 
(Tsakiris, 2008; Tajadura-Jimenez et al., 2012a; 2012b). In line with Experiment 1, we 
hypothesised that individual differences in interoceptive accuracy would account for the 
influence of the change in self-identification experienced during synchronous IMS. However, 
in contrast with Experiment 1, we expected that changes in the representation of one’s identity 
would have a different effect on interoceptive accuracy. Specifically, in line with a previous 
study that has shown the presence of a link between feeling of depersonalization and 
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impairments of interoceptive awareness (Sedeno et al. 2014), we hypothesised that self-other 
blurring would cause a reduced distinctness of the self, which would affect people with higher-
IAcc in their ability to accurately detect any self-relevant information, including their internal 
bodily signals, such as heartbeat information (Apps and Tsakiris, 2013).  
 
Experiment 2 
 
3.1 Materials and Methods 
 
3.1.1 Participants 
 
Participants were 32 female students at Royal Holloway University of London. Three 
were excluded for artefacts at the heart rate data (2) and participant’s inability to detect the 
heartbeat during the MTM task (1), leading to a final sample of 29 participants (Mean age = 
20.31yr, SD =2.33). The study was approved by the Department of Psychology Ethics 
Committee, Royal Holloway, University of London. 
 
 
3.1.2 Experimental setup 
 
Heart rate was monitored using an identical procedure as in Experiment 1. We 
measured interoceptive accuracy using the Mental Tracking Method (MTM) (Schandry, 1981), 
and followed the same procedural guidelines as previously explained. 
For the IMS task, two 120 s “induction movies” were produced to display the face of 
an unfamiliar female individual being touched on the right cheek with a cotton bud. Each stroke 
lasted about 1 s and covered a distance of approximately 2 cm from the zygomatic bone 
downwards (Tajadura-Jimenez et al., 2012a). The two videos only differed in the female 
unknown individual face displayed on the video, whose order was counterbalanced between 
participants. The individuals displayed were 24 and 25 years old. A digital photograph of the 
participant’s face with a neutral facial expression was taken prior to the experimental session. 
The picture was converted to grayscale and mirror transposed and a black template was used 
to remove non-facial attributes (Tajadura-Jimenez, Grehl, and Tsakiris, 2012b). A keyboard 
and Presentation© software were used to control stimuli and collect participant’s responses.  
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3.1.3 Procedure 
After one brief training trial (15 s) during which participants familiarised with the 
MTM, the experimental session started with a Baseline measure of the MTM task. Participants 
were asked to silently count their heartbeat while focusing on the face appearing on the screen. 
The individual’s face displayed could either be the own participant’s face (Self) or the 
unfamiliar face shown during the IMS phase (Other). For each Face Identity block (Self/Other), 
participants repeated the MTM task three times. The three trials (25 s, 35 s, and 45s) were 
presented in random order and constituted a block. Upon completion of this Baseline task, 
participants were exposed to the IMS phase. While the participant was looking at the other’s 
face being touched in one of the pre-recorded 120 s ‘‘induction movies’’, the experimenter 
touched the participant’s face with an identical cotton bud on the specularly congruent location 
(i.e., left side on the participant’s face, and right side on the other’s face) either in synchrony, 
or asynchrony of 1 s, in different blocks. Next, to behaviourally quantify the effect of IMS on 
IAcc, participants performed the same MTM task as the one they had completed at Baseline. 
Participants completed two experimental blocks, one synchronous and one asynchronous, their 
order counterbalanced across participants. In each experimental block, a 40 s “top-up” IMS 
phase interleaved the two Face Identity blocks of MTM task (Self/Other). Throughout the 
experiment, the Other face would always match the face presented to participants during the 
Baseline MTM task. Participants completed 6 MTM task trials in the synchronous block (3 per 
each Face Identity – Self/Other) and 6 MTM tasks in the asynchronous block (3 per each Face 
Identity – Self/Other). The MTM trials were always performed after the visuo-tactile 
stimulation was completed. 
At the end of each experimental block, participants were given to complete a 9-item 
questionnaire on the experience of illusory identification with the other face during 
multisensory stimulation (Table 2). Participants were required to evaluate their agreement in 
relation to each statement, using a 7-point Likert scale (from -3, “strongly disagree”, to +3, 
“strongly agree”).   
To control for guessing of the number of heartbeat during the MTM task (Ainley et al., 
2013), at the end of the experiment participants were asked to estimate the length of three, 
randomly presented, intervals – Time Modulus (19 s, 37 s, and 49 s) (Dunn et al., 2010). 
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Figure 3 Illustration of the experimental paradigm used. Participants performed the MTM task for each 
Face Identity at Baseline. Upon completion of this task, participants were exposed to the IMS phase 
and then performed the MTM task again, with a 40 s “top-up” IMS phase in between MTM blocks 
(Self/Other). They completed one synchronous and one asynchronous block.  
 
3.1.4 Data analysis 
 
Heartbeat traces were analysed using LabChart8, as detailed in Experiment 1.  As in 
Experiment 1, a median split of IAcc scores was performed in the baseline to divide the sample 
into higher-IAcc (above median) and lower-IAcc (below median) participants. However, 
because this experiment comprised two Baseline measures of IAcc, one for the Self Face and 
one for the Other Face, the median split was computed by averaging together Baseline Self and 
Baseline Other (median = 0.698). There were no differences between baseline-Self and 
baseline-Other, t(28) = 1.62, p = 0.12. In the higher-IAcc group participants were 14 female, 
whereas in the lower-IAcc group there were 15 female. As in Experiment 1, we computed 
IAcc-change scores from the baseline; we subtracted the baseline IA score from the Self 
Synchronous-Face IAcc score, the Self Asynchronous-Face IAcc score, the Other-
Synchronous Face IAcc score, and the Other-Asynchronous Face IAcc score to generate four 
IAcc-change scores. Positive scores reflected an improvement from baseline. Data were 
analysed using an ANCOVA with Experimental Condition as a within-subjects variable and 
Order of Presentation and IAcc level as between-subject variables. The Time Modulus and the 
Enfacement scores (average scores in the Synchronous and Asynchronous conditions) were 
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entered as covariates, to account for potential confounds of the heartbeat counting task (Ring 
et al., 2015), and for the possible modulation of the experienced body illusions in IAcc. 
Greenhouse–Geisser correction was applied when sphericity could not be assumed (Mauchly’s 
test for sphericity, p = 0.05). Comparisons were assessed for significance using planned paired 
two-tailed t-tests.  
Questionnaire responses on the subjective experience of enfacement (Shapiro-Wilk test of 
normality: EI synchronous, p = 0.26, EI asynchronous, p = 0. 84) were analysed by averaging 
together ratings across all 9 statements, which provided an estimate of enfacement experienced 
for each participant in each condition. 
 
 
Questionnaire items: Synchronous Asynchronous 
 Mean SD Mean SD  
ITEM 1: I felt like the other's 
face was my face 
0.14 1.88 -1.76 1.50  
ITEM 2: It seemed like the 
other's face belonged to me 
-0.18 1.81 -1.83 1.28  
ITEM 3: It seemed like I was 
looking at my own mirror 
reflection 
0.17 1.97 -1.14 1.75  
ITEM 4: It seemed like the 
other's face began to 
resemble my own face 
0.38 1.78 -1.69 1.56  
ITEM 5: It seemed like my 
own face began to resemble 
the other person's face 
-0.07 1.83 -1.38 1.86  
ITEM 6: It seemed like my 
own face was out of my 
control 
-0.04 1.62 -0.24 1.94  
ITEM 7: It seemed like the 
experience of my face was 
less vivid than normal 
0.48 1.38 0 1.94 
ITEM 8: I felt that I was 
imitating the other person 
0.65 1.63 -0.24 2.03 
ITEM 9: I felt touch on my 
face when I saw the other 
person's face being touched 
2.76 0.95 -1.24 2.05 
Table 2 Questionnaire items presented after the IMS, in both the synchronous and asynchronous 
stimulations, with mean and standard deviation of scores for each question. Participants were required 
to evaluate their agreement in relation to each statement, using a 7-point Likert scale (from -3, “strongly 
disagree”, to +3, “strongly agree”).  
 
3.2 Results  
 
We first examined whether the Enfacement Illusion was successfully elicited using a mixed 
ANOVA. Enfacement scores were entered into a 2 (Conditions: Synchronous vs 
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Asynchronous) x 2 (averaged IAcc level: lower-IAcc vs higher-IAcc) ANOVA. We found that 
the Enfacement Illusion was successfully elicited in the synchronous but not the asynchronous 
condition, F(1,27)= 68.69 p < 0.05, and the strength of the illusion did not depend on averaged 
baseline levels of IAcc, F(1,29)= 0.52 p > 0.05, high-IA group M = 0.59, SD = 1.06; low-IA 
group M = 0.30, SD = 0.95.   
To investigate if and how IAcc was modulated by the experience of the Enfacement Illusion, 
we used a mixed ANCOVA with Condition (Synchronous vs Asynchronous) and Identity (Self 
Face vs Other Face) as within-subject variables, and averaged IAcc level (lower-IAcc vs 
higher-IAcc) and Order of Condition as between-subject factors. We found no significant main 
effect of condition on IAcc, F(1,22) = 0.11, p = 0.74, after controlling for Time Modulus, and 
Enfacement Scores (average scores in the Synchronous and Asynchronous conditions). 
Crucially, the three-way interaction Condition X Identity X IAcc level was significant, F(1,22) 
= 5.33, p = 0.031, ƞ2 = 0.20. To further investigate this interaction, we run two separate mixed 
ANOVAs for each Face Identity (Self and Other), using the averaged IAcc level as between-
subject factor. With regard to the Self Identity we found that, while there was no main effect 
of condition on IAcc, F (1,27) = 2.25, p = 0.16, the interaction Condition X IAcc level was 
significant, F(1,27) = 6.78, p = 0.015, ƞ2 = 0.20, indicating that the feeling of enfacing another 
person’s face through synchronous stroking significantly disrupted interoceptive accuracy 
when watching the Self face for the higher-IAcc group, t(13) = 3.12, p = 0.008, d = 0.69, but 
had no effect on the lower-IAcc group, t(13) = -0.71, p = 0.49 (Figure 4). We found no 
significant main effect of IAcc level, F(1,27) = 2.84, p = 0.10.  In contrast with these results, 
the mixed ANOVA on Other Identity didn’t reveal any significant main effect or interaction 
(main effect Condition, F(1,27) = 1.10, p = 0.31; main effect IAcc level, F(1,27) = 1.49, p = 
0.23; interaction Condition X IAcc level, F(1,27) = 0.08, p = 0.78 – Figure 4), suggesting that 
our enfacement manipulation didn’t affect individuals’ ability to perform the MTM task when 
watching the other person’s face. 
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Figure 4 Mean IAcc-change scores of the lower-IAcc and higher-IAcc groups in Enfacement Illusion 
(Synchronous) and asynchronous (Asynchronous) conditions, under the Self Face Identity and Other-
Face Identity manipulations. Error bars show standard error (SE). 
 
4. Discussion 
 
Across two experiments, we investigated whether changes in BSC change interoceptive 
accuracy. In Experiment 1 we manipulated participants’ sense of body-ownership by applying 
the RHI. The induction of an illusory sense of body-ownership significantly improved the 
performance at a standard heartbeat-counting task in individuals with lower interoceptive 
accuracy at baseline, but did not benefit individuals with higher interoceptive accuracy. These 
results suggest that, in the process of re-instating a sense of body-ownership, individuals with 
initially lower accuracy in detecting internal bodily sensations benefit from exteroceptive 
bodily signals in order to acquire information about their internal state and improve their 
interoceptive accuracy.   
Experiment 2 investigated whether the exteroceptively-driven change in interoceptive 
accuracy found in Experiment 1 could be extended to components of self-awareness other than 
body-ownership. Here we measured whether changes in self-identification through the use of 
the EI could affect individuals’ ability to detect their internal bodily signals. We found that 
participants with initially higher-IAcc did not benefit from the illusion; instead, their IAcc 
performance while looking at their own face significantly decreased after experiencing the 
Enfacement Illusion with another face.  
In both experiments, the effect was independent of the order in which the conditions were 
presented, the participants’ own estimations of time intervals and heart rate. The presence of a 
-0.12
-0.07
-0.02
0.03
0.08
Self Synchronous Self Asynchronous Other Synchronous Other Asynchronous
LOWER-IAcc HIGHER-IAcc
* 
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significant interaction between synchronous and asynchronous conditions excludes the 
possibility of a general practice effect. Importantly, participants showed a significant change 
after synchronous stroking, over and above the mere presence of multisensory stimulation (i.e. 
asynchronous condition), which exclude any possible effect due to regression to the mean.  In 
our experiments, participants performed the MTM task after the visuo-tactile stimulation was 
completed. This setting allowed us to distinguish the exteroceptive and interoceptive tasks and 
minimize any possible interference between them. Additionally, across all trials participants 
were looking at the rubber hand (Experiment 1) and at the Self- or Other-face (Experiment 2) 
in the absence of any stimulation, to ensure that participants’ attention was comparable across 
conditions. 
In our sample the reported experiences of body-ownership and self-identification did not 
correlate with the performance in the heartbeat counting task. While previous studies found 
evidence of a negative correlation between measures of body-ownership and interoceptive 
accuracy (Tsakiris et al., 2011; see also Schauder et al., 2015 for a replication) and self-
identification and interoceptive accuracy (Tajadura-Jimenez et al., 2014), research that 
implemented the cardio-visual feedback (Suzuki et al., 2013) reported a positive correlation 
between strength of the illusion and interoceptive accuracy. Importantly, in the present study, 
unlike the studies by Tsakiris et al (2011) and Schauder et al (2015) were participants 
performed the heartbeat counting task only at baseline, while looking at blank screen, 
participants performed the heartbeat counting task while they were looking at a body-part or 
face even at baseline. Overall, these results suggest that perhaps the relationship between 
interoceptive and exteroceptive bodily cues is more complex and largely context-dependent. In 
both experiments we found that participants reported a stronger illusion in the synchronous 
compared to the asynchronous condition, however the strength of subjective experience in the 
EI is lower compared to the RHI, consistent with previous studies. We believe this difference 
could be due to the different components of bodily self-consciousness underlying the two 
illusions. While the RHI involves the vivid experience of changes in ownership of body-parts, 
the EI tackles into a fundamental component of selfhood, that is one’s face, where self-other 
blurring usually appears in a less vivid manner. In this sense, a self-recognition task would 
have perhaps helped in capturing changes in self-identification across conditions. Future 
investigations of the topic should introduce the self-recognition measure as an additional and 
probably subtler measure of the enfacement. 
Previous research on the physiological mechanisms that underlie the experience of 
body-awareness has shown how changes in the experience of body-ownership in the RHI 
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results in changes in internal autonomic processes, such as a drop in skin temperature of the 
hand (Moseley et al., 2008; but see Rohde et al., 2013). Other studies have shown how accuracy 
in detection of interoceptive states such as heartbeats (Tsakiris et al., 2011; Tajadura-Jimenez 
& Tsakiris, 2014) and controlled changes in interoceptive input (Kammers, Rose, & Haggard, 
2011, Crucianelli et al., 2013; Lloyd et al., 2013) modulate the experience of body-ownership. 
However, the present study is the first to provide direct evidence of the reverse effect, by 
showing how exteroceptively-driven changes in BSC can in turn alter interoceptive accuracy.  
In Experiment 1, we show that after reporting a change in body-ownership, only 
individuals with lower-IAcc benefit from it. Recent studies have shown that attention to 
exteroceptive bodily signals facilitates processing of self-related information, like 
interoception (Ainley et al., 2012; Maister and Tsakiris, 2014; Maister et al., 2014). With the 
present study we corroborate this hypothesis and further demonstrate that the specific 
experiences of body-ownership seem to be crucial for interoceptive accuracy.  In Experiment 
2, however, we show a different effect, namely that after experiencing a change in self-
identification, individuals with higher-IAcc decrease their ability to accurately detect their 
heartbeat. In these individuals, the change in self-identification may conflict with their 
interoceptive predictions of how looking at or identifying with one’s face feels like (Aspell et 
al., 2013). Crucially, this was especially true after synchronous interpersonal multisensory 
stimulation, where self-other blurring presumably caused a decrease in vividness of the self, 
which in turn resulted in the reduced ability to accurately detect self-relevant information in 
another domain, namely interoception (Apps and Tsakiris, 2014). Taken together, the previous 
and current findings seem to support recent predictive coding models of self-awareness (Apps 
& Tsakiris, 2014; Sel, Harding  & Tsakiris, 2016; Seth, 2013) according to which one’s body 
is processed in a probabilistic manner as the most likely to be ‘me’. Such probabilistic 
representations are created through the integration of top-down ‘predictions’ about the body 
and of bottom-up ‘prediction errors’ from unimodal sensory systems that are then accounted 
for. Bidirectional interactions between exteroceptive and interoceptive systems are essential 
for an integrated awareness of one’s body. Our results can thus be explained in light of a 
predictive coding account. The observed results support the view that the self is a multimodal 
and hierarchical construct that is critically dependent on multisensory input. Furthermore, the 
effects of the multisensory-induced changes along this hierarchy depend on both the exact 
bodily representation affected (e.g. body-ownership or self-identification) and the precision of 
the prior.  
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According to predictive coding, changes in body-ownership after the RHI should result 
in increased IAcc for participants with lower IAcc at baseline, because synchronous 
multisensory stimulation raises the precision of higher-level priors for the self, and this in turn 
increases the precision of all self-relevant data, including interoceptive information (Apps & 
Tsakiris, 2014).  In contrast, in the Enfacement Illusion, that uses multisensory stimulation as 
the RHI but in a more social context, the increased precision of high-level priors may have a 
different effect, as a result of self-other blurring. For faces, that are central to one’s identity as 
well as inherently social stimuli, interoceptive priors and prediction errors of how it feels like 
to look at one’s face (or at other people) may be more precise. It has been shown that prediction 
errors related to the processing of one’s face identity as opposed to one’s body-identity result 
in larger mismatch responses, indicative of larger prediction errors (see Experiment 2 in Sel, 
Harding, and Tsakiris, 2016). In explaining away such larger prediction errors, precision in the 
interoceptive domain may be reduced, affecting performance in participants with higher IAcc. 
By increasing the probability that the other face is represented as part of the self (and decreasing 
the probability that one’s actual face is represented as ‘self’), the ability to distinguish between 
self and other is reduced. In people with lower-IAcc, whose priors about the self are already 
imprecise, this is unlikely to have any added effect on heartbeat perception. However, in people 
with initially higher-IAcc this increase in ‘surprise’ as a result of the illusion may (erroneously) 
update the high-level prior, causing self-other blurring, which would explain why they become 
less accurate in heartbeat counting. Electrophysiological studies that quantify the Heartbeat 
Evoked Potential under such bodily illusions may elucidate the underlying neurophysiological 
mechanism. 
We hypothesize that the observed changes in IAcc in both experiments could be attributed to 
modulations of neural processing in the right anterior insula, a candidate area for hierarchically 
organized multimodal predictive models of self-representations (Allen et al, 2015; Gu et al, 
2013), where multisensory information from interoceptive and exteroceptive signals is 
processed to establish the predictive model of an integrated bodily self (Seth, 2013; Apps & 
Tsakiris, 2014). In fact, right anterior insula activity correlates with performance in 
interoceptive accuracy tasks (Critchley et al, 2004). Ronchi et al (2015) report a single-case 
study showing that heartbeat awareness decreased after insular resection. Salomon and 
colleagues (2016) showed that this region is sensitive to synchronicity of visual and cardiac 
signals, both in the case of visible and invisible visual cues. Right mid-posterior insula activity 
correlates with the body-ownership experienced during the RHI (Tsakiris et al, 2007), and the 
same area seems to be the critical lesion site for somatoparaphrenia, a striking loss of body-
Heartfelt Embodiment 
 
ownership (Baier & Karnath, 2010). These findings suggest that the interoceptive and the 
exteroceptive body are integrated from the posterior to anterior subregions across the insular 
cortex (Simmons et al, 2013), that seems to underpin the experience of this body as mine, an 
experience that is the hallmark of the bodily self. Importantly, beyond the representation of the 
body, the insular cortex is also linked to the processing of representations of self and others, in 
terms of their facial identity (Devue & Brédart, 2011) and a wide range of social cognition 
processes such as empathy (Bernhardt & Singer, 2012), highlighting its importance beyond the 
self itself. However, future research and advances in methods are needed to understand for 
what are the precise neural computations that within the same neural network process 
information about the self or about the self in relation to others.  
In summary, our data show that changes in exteroceptive self-awareness can influence 
interoceptive accuracy. We further show that changes on body-ownership and self-
identification have contrasting effects on interoceptive accuracy. The specificity of this effect 
could be attributed to the component of bodily self-consciousness being manipulated across 
the two different bodily illusions (self-identification vs body-ownership). The evidence that 
lower interoceptive accuracy can be enhanced by attending to external body-related 
information corroborates previous work (Ainley et al., 2012; 2013; Maister et al., 2014) and 
further shows that changes in the specific experience of body-ownership can significantly 
modulate the detection of internal body signals. These findings have potential important 
implication for our understanding of intact as well as impaired body awareness, such as 
neuropsychological syndromes (Jenkinson et al., 2013; Fotopoulou et al., 2011) and psychiatric 
disorders such as eating and body-image disorders (Eshkevari et al., 2012; Pollatos et al., 2008; 
Keizer et al., 2014). Similarly, the findings that interoceptive accuracy may be affected under 
conditions that blur self-other boundaries may have important theoretical implications for our 
understanding of the social function that interoceptive states and their awareness may play in 
social interactions (Bird & Viding, 2014) and their disorders (Schilbach, 2016). 
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